



**Politics of Statue:
Peace Monument and the Personification of Memory**

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August 2016

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Abstract

The very purpose of statue is to bring the past into the present and even further for progeny. An effective statue as symbol generates far-reaching political power as a processor, mediator, and transmitter of memory. In this regard, this paper attempts to take an approach regarding the political meaning of the Peace Monument, in order to answer the question of “why does Japan keep on demanding the removal of the statue?” Although some say that the 2015 agreement between Korea and Japan concerning the comfort women issue marked another stage in the progress of the bilateral relationship for future generation, it sparked an angry backlash in Korea for being another humiliation of the victims and the Korean people. This paper argues that the disruptions in the current Korea-Japan relationship emanate from its unique characteristic where people are overly awash with affection rather than cognition in evaluating the statue. Because public recollections of the same historical events of Korea and Japan are anchored in dichotomized memories, the colonial memory has been crowded out in Japan but remains strong in Korea. In this circumstance, the Peace Monument lit the fuse of the sensitive issue to become a political football by the personification of memory into a tangible and sympathetic figure. Its symbol of resistance to urge for Japan’s sincere apology has been augmented by the triangular interaction of the statue, its location, and the ceaseless collective actions around the statue as the pivotal figure. As a consequence, the Peace Monument significantly contributed to the making of the politics of identity and the space for resistance.

Keywords: *Peace Monument, Politics of Statue, Korea-Japan Relations, Comfort Women, Personification of Memory*

I. Introduction

Today, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs is stuck in a Chinese finger trap; the more it tries to settle down the issue of “comfort women” who were forced to work in Japanese brothels during World War II, the more it only tightens the trap. Ever since the establishment of the Abe-Park era from early 2013, Korea-Japan relations has at times been a source of angst to the international cooperative environment in Northeast Asia. And the comfort women issue has been a significant trigger for bipartite diplomatic relations to go steadily downhill. Regardless of the agreement made on December 28, 2015, which calls upon Japan to give 1 billion yen to a fund for the elderly victims as a solution to tranquilize the heated controversy over the comfort women issue, its follow-up measures

still seem to have a long way to go due to the opposition in both countries.

And there stands a statue, in the midst of the raging storm between two countries. This life size statue of a girl was first unveiled in 2011, standing across the street from the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, and has since been a magnet for Koreans paying tributes to the victims of sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army. The initial creator of the statue, Kim Eun-sung and Kim Seo-kyung, explained that they merely wanted to touch people's hearts by showing the suppressed emotion, grief and anger of all the victimized women, naming it "Peace Monument".¹ And yet, Tokyo has been particularly specific in demanding the removal of the statue from its embassy after the 2015 agreement. Furthermore, many have been inspired by the statue and even added their own interpretations on top of the initial message, thus making it asocio-political symbolic resource in constructing and reproducing the actor-specific, interactive, and interpersonal identities.

In sum, the statue has been given various meanings with regards to the changes in the political and diplomatic context. This paper thus asks the fundamental question of "why the statue?" If the Peace Monument is deemed so offensive and shameful by Japanese people that its removal has repeatedly been demanded after the agreement, one should take a closer look at why and how this bronze statue of a girl can voice a strong political message. Although there exist numerous studies and articles that have focused on the Peace Monument, their major concerns mostly capitalize on its symbolic meaning of a victimized virginal innocence to criticize Japan's half-hearted and diluted apologies. Nonetheless, in order to appreciate the Peace Monument on a new angle from impartial and objective perspective, it is important to analyze its political implication in a broader context. Taking a step further from other works related to individual case studies of statue and its symbolic representation of the political power, this paper attempts to argue that a statue not only narrates the specific memory of the past but also asserts the non-eroding connection between the past and the present by personifying collective memory. Analysis starts from the distinctiveness of the Korea-Japan relationship in order to understand the unique characteristic of the Peace Monument. This paper will then further investigate how the politics of statue is applied to this specific case of the Peace Monument.

II. Politics of the Peace Monument: Distinctiveness of the Korea-Japan relationship

Statue is the epitome of the interaction between the past and the present. That is, a statue does not merely stay in the past when it was first erected; its value or message either gets overthrown or gets fortified as time passes. Taking this into consideration, this paper argues that how the public apprehends a statue can widely vary according to the following categories of conceptualization:

First of all, the value of a statue can either be universally accepted or partisan and

¹ Korea Joongang Daily, "STATUE: Politics and art impossible to separate," January 19, 2016.

controversial. Statue can be premised upon mutual universal and/or social value, such as the Nelson Mandela statue, where there is no or minimal dispute over the existence of the statue so that the demand for replica of the original keeps on being raised in order to spread its value. On the other hand, statue that is *not* premised upon universal agreement is very likely to face harsh criticism and controversy or to be pulled down eventually, such as the Cecil Rhodes statue.

Second, because statue itself as symbol is a powerful expression of a specific message, *by whom* the statue is built – either by the perpetrators or by the victims – is crucial in understanding its meaning. Statue of the victor consolidates the victor's power by propagating its triumphant value and memory and by shifting the paradigm into something that is more favorable to the conqueror while successfully suppressing the defeated value. Statue of the victim, on the contrary, is bestowed a conflicting socio-political message, as for one side it is a symbol of commemoration and remembrance of the victims by alerting the audience to the calamity of violence and for another side it is an unpleasant reminder of the past misdeeds.

However, evaluating the Peace Monument is complicated in that it cannot be fully appreciated by fitting it strictly into any of the aforementioned framework. The memory of comfort women is remembered differently between Korean and Japanese publics. For Koreans, it is a statue of the victims; but it does not necessarily mean that Japanese also share the meaning of it. For the latter, it could be a statue of the victor in the sense that Koreans try to overwhelm and propagate the war on memory by erecting the replicas of the Peace Monument not only in Korea but also in other countries that are not even directly related to the comfort women issue. Therefore, one should investigate in-depth about the distinctiveness of the Korea-Japan relationship as follows.

(1) Evaluation by affection, lacking cognition

Alvin Toffler commented about three kinds of power, of which being violence, financial power, and information or knowledge (Toffler 1984). However, violence cannot be the ultimatum in obtaining power. Weber contends that power is the ability to achieve one's will in social relationship, even against the resistance of a particular group or individual (Weber 1922). Moreover, Lasswell's approach towards the definition of power as a relational process can be appreciated in that "power is a special case of the exercise of influence, it is the process of affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) several deprivations for non-conformity with the policies intended" (Lasswell 1950, 76). Long-lasting power thus stems from emotion that is deeply rooted in people's mindset.

Many of the existing studies which have focused on statue as effective means of reproducing political power owe inspiration to the work of Charles E. Merriam. According to Merriam's concept of "symbol manipulation", because power is exhaustible, ruler is ought to seek for the most desirable way to continue reproducing the "efficient exercise of power". Policy circulation can be one way, of which being traditional and rational way, but is risky. Merriam argues that the most desirable way a

ruler can continue to reproduce his power is via symbol manipulation: one being Miranda, the symbol of identification, which appeals to emotion, the other being Credenda, the symbol of rationalization, which appeals to reason and persuades with reason (Merriam 1950). That being, Miranda of political power encourages people's obedience or respect to the ruler by the establishment of rapport. "Symbols are what unite and divide people. Symbols give us our identity, our self-image, our way of explaining ourselves to others. Symbols in turn determine the kinds of stories we tell; and the stories we tell determine the kind of history we make and remake."²

But there is a limitation in interpreting the meaning of the Peace Monument of Korea with the aforementioned approach of understanding statue as symbol of identification because Merriam contended that Miranda is exercised especially when the public faces the chaotic social breakdown of anomie. Instead of being used for top-down manipulation of the public mass, the Peace Monument rather represents the Korean public sphere's bottom-up confrontation with the Japanese state power, which sometimes even counters its own government. Therefore, this paper attempts to take an approach regarding the meaning of the Peace Monument on the international basis beyond the confines of Korea-Japan relationship by incorporating additional variables, while still embracing the symbolic and political meaning of statue.

The Peace Monument functions as an associate which triggers "evaluation" through "affection". According to the definition by the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, "political culture" is the "set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system".³ Encompassing both the history of a polity and the histories of its members, one might say that a political culture has its root equally in public events and private experiences.⁴ At the core of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's concept of "civic culture" lies the meaning of political culture as a set of individual orientations linked to political objects, where orientation can take three forms: cognitive orientation, affective orientation, and evaluative orientation. Cognitive orientation specifies the knowledge or belief about the political system, its roles, inputs and outputs. Affective orientation highlights the feelings about the political system, its personnel and performance. Evaluative orientation involves judgments and opinions about political objects that generally stem from one's value standards through information and feelings (Almond and Verba 1963, 14).

The comfort women issue itself is highly sensitive politically, historically and even individually due to its painful legacy of remembrance. Therefore, it appears to take on the aspect of proceeding directly towards evaluation from subjective feelings and personal or social sympathy, not from precise cognition or knowledge about the controversial matter. In other words, because the Peace

² Mary Robinson, Inauguration speech as President of Ireland, December 3, 1990.

³ "Political culture," last modified 1968, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Political_culture.aspx.

⁴ "International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences," New York: Macmillan (1968): Vol. 12, p. 218 (quoted in Jo Freedman, *The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties* (1986).

Monument has been engraved with the collective identity of the Koreans including not only the victims of Japan's wartime sexual slavery but also those who share and inherit the memory of colonial period, the implication of the statue goes beyond "narration" to "assertion". Thus the mechanism of "Behavior = Environment + Affection" rather than "Behavior = Environment + Cognition" as is put forward by social-cognitive theory can better explain the spiral dilemma between two countries.

(2) Mono-memory of Korea vs. Dual memories of Japan⁵: the clash between "selected" memories

Diverse identities tend to clash which undermines constructive dialogues and results in a messy process of reconciliation when memory discourse is shaped by victimhood, as is the case at the present day East Asia (Huyssen 1995, 5). The politics of war memory explores "the ways in which wars can be remembered, across forms that range from public commemoration orchestrated by nation-states through to the personal testimonies of war survivors" (Ashplant et al. 2000, xi). The fundamentality behind the continuous reproduction of incongruent political and social discourses between two countries stems from the lingering clash between their dichotomized identities and memories. Colonial memory and war memory are still deeply embedded in Korea and Japan respectively, which are expected to be preserved regardless of the generation change due to the series of unsatisfactory reconciliation during the last few decades.

In Japan's public memory of war, selective amnesia takes place: War itself is often the enemy, and the Japanese its victims (Cook 2003). First, the ordinary Japanese themselves also suffered from the war. Not only did Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by atomic bombs, but some three million Japanese were killed out of a total of 74 million (Onuma 2002, 604). Second, Japan's major allies carried out generous policies toward postwar Japan and concluded the problems of war compensations in lenient terms. Such was apparent when the U.S. took an extremely generous policy towards Japan at the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Even when Tojo Hideki, who was the general of the Japanese Imperial Army, and some other leaders were trialed and prosecuted for carrying out aggressive wars, not only the punished were few in number but ordinary Japanese people also did not regard it as a condemnation of all Japanese. To them, they were not perpetrators of war, but rather bystanders and victims. Furthermore, even though China was one of the hardest-hit sufferers by Japanese aggression, the Chinese government relinquished its claim for apologies and war compensations when Japan and China normalized their relationship in 1972. The Chinese leadership kept a firm grip on the principle that only a limited number of Japanese militarist leaders and war criminals should take all the blame, not its people. All of these factors contributed to postwar

⁵ The expression of 'Mono-memory' and 'Dual memories' is a quotation from Sang Joon Kim's paper "Korea and Japan: Colonial Memory vs. War Memory" which was presented at the conference in Warsaw, July 30, 2015, "Polish-German Reconciliation Process: Can Be a Model for Rapprochement in East Asia?"

Japan's reinforcement of self-indulgence. Even though some of the victims such as South and North Korea and the Philippines condemned Japan with harsher attitudes, Japan did not pay any attention to the voices of such "small nations" until the 1970s (Onuma 2002, 605).

Therefore, Japan has dual postwar memories – one being the cognitions of the war dead rather than that of the war brutalities which is apparently promoted by the Yasukuni shrine, and another being mixed with their own sense of victimization as the only country to have suffered an A-bomb nuclear attack. Sang Joon Kim (2005) terms the dual memories of Japan "Yasukuni memory" and "Hiroshima memory". Of the three identities – legitimatizing identity, project identity, resistance identity – that Manuel Castells categorize at the social level (Castells 1997, 7-9), the author argues that the Yasukuni memory promotes "legitimizing identity" by juxtaposing a number of Japanese wars from the Sino-Japan war, Russo-Japan war to the Pacific war, while the Hiroshima memory reinforces "projective identity" which promotes Japan's postwar identity as a peace-loving and peace-keeping nation (Kim 2005).

In addition, Japan is a country where religion takes a huge part in their everyday life, including their socio-political activities. Its political and social practices and belief systems have been influenced and sanctioned to the great extent by Shinto, an indigenous Japanese religion of nature and ancestor-worship. Whereas many of the other countries separate religion from state by commemorating the deceased war dead in a separate space such as the National Cemetery in Daejeon of Korea and Arlington National Cemetery of the United States of America (hereinafter U.S.), Japan has substituted the problem of the War by their religious belief, both nationally and individually. Because the commemoration of their war dead during the World War II is in their private realm, the fact that other countries that are urging Japan quit visiting the Yasukuni shrine or apologize for the past wrongdoings that their ancestors had done is something that is not within their authority to interfere. Taking this into consideration, perhaps to Japan, the Peace Monument is merely an aggressive propaganda to create international misunderstandings of Japan, rather than a symbol that represents the past victims who vanished under violence and the future hope of mutual understanding of peace, the need for sincere apologies and avoidance of any kind of similar violence from ever happening again.

This phenomenon is largely due to Japan's peculiar statecraft and value system. According to Karel Van Wolferen, Japan's structural system is a truncated pyramid where "a complex of overlapping hierarchies" with "no peak" exists so that no one is ultimately in charge (Wolferen 1990, 5). For centuries it has maintained a balance between the shared powers by semi-autonomous groups such as the bureaucrat-LDP-business triad, the press, the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (Wolferen 1990, 41) and several other semi-self-contained, semi-mutually dependent bodies (Wolferen 1990, 42). Furthermore, he points out that "understanding" (*wakaru*) in the Japanese context connotes the meaning of "agreeing", in that true mutual understanding requires both parties to

accept each other the way they are, as long as neither one of them is strong enough to change the structure (Wolferen 1990, 10-11). In this regard, this paper argues that the Peace Monument can only arouse the “shame” among the Japanese of not being internationally understood of their own victimized memory, for the existence of the Peace Monument demonstrates the international society’s permanent lack of understanding of Japan.

On the other hand, Korea does not share Japan’s war memory but is overwhelmed by the mono-memory of Japan the colonizer. Because the colonial memory is difficult to be dug up voluntarily at its roots by the suppressed due to its pain and shame, “details” of the colonial memory have been eroded away while leaving behind mere “image” of the memory. For example, the name-changing campaign in 1940 as means of the assimilation policy under the Japanese Colonial Government made it mandatory for all Koreans to change their names to Japanese ones. As a result, 80.3% of the Koreans voluntarily replaced their original name and the remaining 19.7% also had their name changed by the exercise of the Japanese Government General of Korea’s authority (Koo 2005). Although near 100% of the colonial generation of Korea had such experience of indignity, it is one of the shameful taboos that no one dares to bring up in today’s Korean society. Consequently, particular memories have been selected by the Koreans as an effective tool to demand Japan incorporate Korea’s colonial memory into Japan’s war memory, one of them being the comfort women issue.

Nevertheless, room for Korea’s mono-memory to settle in Japan’s war memory is small and cramped. Breakthrough in the bipartite dispute over the comfort women issue and other historical problems seems yet to come. Unfortunately, neither country could have had an earnest endeavor to bridge the gap between the two nor did each side try to talk about the issue under the spotlight within their public sphere. Like spinning a top, both countries are now whipping their own selected collective memory of the past, which is making the present controversy ever more heated.

III. The Peace Monument and its Personification of the Memory


One should distinguish between “statue as art” and “statue as symbol”. It is difficult to bestow socio-political identity on a statue as an artistic sculpture because of its exclusiveness. Nowadays, 3D scanning technologies allow art objects to be easily conserved, digitalized and reproduced. But in this case, making replicas of the original artwork faces the problem of copyright, doubt on quality and authenticity of the scan, and controversy over cultural theft. For instance, the 3D model of Nefertiti bust created storm over cultural theft between the German museum authorities and two German artists who secretly scanned the statue at the Neues Museum and released the data to the world.⁶ As a result, the simplified accessibility has made the bust at the museum lose the uniqueness of the statue and its location where it is currently being displayed. On the other hand, the Peace

⁶ International New York Times, “Swiping a priceless antiquity,” March 3, 2016.

Monument, of which its existence itself is composed of many symbolic meanings, is ceaselessly being encouraged to be reproduced not only in Korea but also in various places around the world.

Statue as symbol can be a powerful political tool in that it makes the audience identify other with self by personifying the memory. The Peace Monument in the heart of the capital city of Korea not only endows the spatial characteristic with the statue, but also invites the crowd to sit beside the girl and think about the past misdeeds and brutality exercised upon the victims of wartime sex slavery. In this sense, the Peace Monument does not confine itself to a mere sculpture that is simply designed to console and remember the victims of sexual slavery. And yet, it is the tool for the localization of the specific memory: it is the visualization and embodiment of the tragic case at one point of the history of mankind while at the same time is the symbol that localizes its prominence in the present and in the future. The localization of memory can be a powerful political tool in that it attracts people to a totality of thoughts regardless of whether or not they are associated within the corresponding memory group (Halbwachs 1992, 53).

Comfort Women Memorials around the World



<Graph 1> Comfort Women Memorials around the World

Memorials in Korea and Abroad



<Graph 2> Memorials in Korea and Abroad

In this regard, this paper argues that the Peace Monument's successful personification of memory intertwined with the participatory experience of the weekly Wednesday demonstrations and its locational characteristic accentuates its political function and its representation of resistance to the international audience. The symbolic meaning of the Peace Monument has been maximized together with its location. The original statue was installed at the site in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to commemorate the 1,000th weekly rally, and immediately turned its stage into the representational space of resistance. Spatial representation of resistance is important in that it narrates the intensity of the event and carves it into the public memory as a symbolic landmark (Chung 2013, 104). The symbolic meaning of space can be easily understood when considering the example of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China or the Egyptian revolution of 2011 at the Tahrir Square.

As can be seen in <Graph 1>, the number of replica of the original statue has exponentially increased as time passes. As a result, the memory which used to be almost only specific to the actual victims until the point when the statue was built began to proliferate in the country. Whether or not the memory is old or more recent one, statue as symbol arouses either sense of kinship or sense of animosity. In other words, because the Peace Monument exists as if it is personified by being given a collective identity of the specific group and of those who retrieve its remembrances and connect themselves to the same memory, it is treated either like a comrade or like an enemy, depending on to which group of memory the person belongs.

Nobuyuki Suzuki, a member of a right-wing Japanese political group, was indicted for vandalizing the original Peace Monument by hammering a stake which read "Takeshima belongs to Japan" on June 19, 2012. The angry comfort women victims and Korean civic organizations confronted the incident with filing a case on July 4, 2012, but Suzuki never responded to the prosecutors.⁷ Nevertheless, the prosecution continues even until nowadays, as the comfort women victims sued Suzuki again in May 21, 2015, for defamation and libel. The case of Nobuyuki resulted in attracting great public attention to the Peace Monument, transforming it into a medium that reminds people of the memory of the comfort women and boosts the public's emotional affection by making the issue more personal (Chung 2013, 111). When the Peace Monument was once again struck with hammer on June 3, 2016, it aroused a storm of public indignation in Korea. Furthermore, not only a policeman who held an umbrella over the statue on a rainy day made headlines, but people also have adorned the statue in keeping with the season, treating it like a real girl.

⁷ Japan Daily Press, "Japanese political activist charged with vandalism of South Korean comfort women monument," February 19, 2013, accessed June 5, 2016, <http://japandailynews.com/japanese-political-activist-charged-with-vandalism-of-south-korean-comfort-women-monument-1923583/>.




Figure 1. Augmented symbol of resistance by the triangular interconnection of three factors

As a consequence, the Peace Monument has become a powerful political symbol which propagates Korea's particular war memory. As can be seen in <Graph 2>, controversial reactions to the Peace Monument have also been reproduced even outside Korea as its replicas began to emerge overseas immediately after the installation of the original statue in 2011. As such, the propagation of value by reproducing a statue is to a great extent political in that it extends the value far beyond the boundaries of its specific interest group. Another example can be the statue of the Goddess of Democracy which was first unveiled during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China in order to assert the struggle for democracy under the communist rules. The Goddess of Democracy soon became an icon for the democratic movement against communism. Replicas and tributes to the statue have cropped up in other countries, one of which being the U.S., in San Francisco's Chinatown and at the Victims of Communism Memorial. In the case of the Peace Monument, the phenomenon where civic organizations mostly take the lead in proliferating the Peace Monument has made it even more difficult for Japan to accuse the Korean government as an only responsible actor of the spread of the statue within the public sphere.

The political function of the statue has continuously been reaffirmed whenever Japan responded with expressions of fierce resentment towards the existence of the Peace Monument and with a firm attitude towards its removal. The Internet campaign of 2012 by Japan to pressure the U.S. to remove the statue in Palisade Park, New Jersey, and to stop the "international harassment" of Japanese people (Kim 2014) was one example. Moreover, the Japanese opponents filed a lawsuit against Glendale in order to remove the first Peace Monument to be installed overseas in Glendale Park, California, in July 2013. Japan also has been arguing that the Peace Monument violates international law and diplomacy for it retains an ostentatious display of outrage on view near an

embassy, “which Japan cites as a symbol of South Korea’s reluctance to settle down the issue”.⁸

In this regard, the Peace Monument is not just a statue of the victims; because the memories are dichotomized between two countries, it leaves a room to be criticized that it is a statue of the victors in the sense that Koreans try to overwhelm the war on memory. However, this paper contends that even though the majority of Japanese consider themselves as victims of war as well, it is difficult for those who are against the value of the Peace Monument to negate its message or to create a statue of their own because the aggressor image is more prominent in the global society regarding the comfort women issue as well as its misdeeds during the colonial period. Thus the Peace Monument will continuously play the pivotal role of the comfort women issue as long as both sides keep stressing the value of their own memory as a victim.

IV. Conclusion

The very purpose of statue is to bring the past into the present and even further for progeny. An effective statue as symbol generates far-reaching political power as a processor, mediator, and transmitter of memory. Although some say that the 2015 agreement marked another stage in the progress of the bilateral relationship for future generation, it sparked an angry backlash in Korea for being another humiliation of the victims and the Korean people. The disruptions in the current Korea-Japan relationship emanate from its unique characteristic where people are overly awash with affection rather than cognition in evaluating the statue. Because public recollections of the same historical events of Korea and Japan are anchored in dichotomized memories, the colonial memory has been crowded out in Japan but remains strong in Korea. In this circumstance, the Peace Monument lit the fuse of the sensitive issue to become a political football by the personification of memory into a tangible and sympathetic figure. Its symbol of resistance to urge for Japan’s sincere apology has been augmented by the triangular interaction of the statue, its location, and the ceaseless collective actions around the statue as the pivotal figure. As a consequence, the Peace Monument significantly contributed to the making of the politics of identity and the space for resistance.

Nonetheless, in spite of the Japanese government’s official apologies and compensations, severe backlashes and disputes over the removal of a statue in Japan have continuously been raised. As a result, it made the Koreans question the sincerity of Japan’s apology and the efficacy of the government’s diplomatic talks, which only strengthened the symbol of resistance of the Peace Monument as an unofficial channel to propagate the colonial memory of Korea. The failure of mutual understanding between two countries is because the burden appears to be mostly imposed upon Japan to rectify its memory myopia while the contrite party does not understand the importance of sharing

⁸The Korea Herald, “Japan officially apologies, offers funds: Questions remain over Tokyo’s stance on taking responsibility for wartime sex slavery,” December 28, 2015, accessed June 5, 2016, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20151228000889>.

the counterpart's memory. In this sense, Lind's argument can be appreciated in that the historical remembrance of a state is crucial in having emotional effects on observers in the opposing state and in other countries; the denial and distortion of a state's past revisionist behavior can fuel doubts about its current intentions and hostility between the countries (Lind 2008; cited in Glaser et al. 2009, 338-339). Of course, many states have been able to reconcile without apologies for past aggression such as Japan not having apologized to the U.S. for attacking Pearl Harbor. However, Lind (2008) argues that intentions matter; states assess others' intentions which in turn influences their policies. Therefore, this paper highlights the importance of appreciating the Peace Monument as a momentum for both Korea and Japan to more thoroughly question how the past matters and to endeavor to bridge the gap between each side's self-referential views of the past in order to reduce the chance of regressive tit-for-tat reactions.

Appendix I)⁹

The memorial statues abroad are shaded with gray.

Date	Title	Location	Creator
August 14, 1998	Comfort Women Memorial (못다핀꽃)	The House of Sharing, Gwangju, Korea	Professor Yoon, Young-suk
September 8, 2008	Comfort Women Memorial (아리랑비)	Miyako(jima) Island, Okinawa, Japan	-
October 25, 2010	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	Palisades Park, New Jersey, United States of America	Korean American Voters' Council
December 14, 2011	Peace Monument	Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Korea	The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan
May 5, 2012	Peace Monument	War&Women's Human Rights Museum, Seoul, Korea	The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan
June 20, 2012	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	Veterans Memorial in Nassau County on Long Island, New York, United States of America	Korean American Public Affairs Committee, the Government of Nassau County, Gwangju city
December 1, 2012	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	Garden Grove AR Galleria in Orange County, California, United States of America	Civic organization (미주위안부기림비건립위원회)
March 8, 2013	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	Memorial Island, Bergen County, New Jersey, United States of America	The Government of Bergen County
April 6, 2013	Comfort Women Memorial (정의비; 正義碑)	Tongyeong, Korea(남망산공원)	Civic organization (일본군위안부피해자정의비건립위원회)
May, 2013	Peace Monument	Goyang, Korea(일산문화광장)	Goyang city
July 27, 2013	Peace Monument	Glendale Central Park, California, United States of America	Korean American Forum of California
September 4, 2013	Peace Monument	Seocho high school, Seoul, Korea	Seocho high school
November 12, 2013	Peace Monument	The National Women's History Exhibition Hall, Goyang, Korea	Kim Eun-sung and Kim Seo-kyung
January 17, 2014	Peace Monument	Geoje Arts Center, Geoje, Korea	Civic organization (거제일본군위안부피해자추모비추진위원회)
January 19, 2014	Comfort Women	Veterans Memorial in Nassau County on	Korean American Public Affairs Committee,

⁹ Map of the Comfort Women Memorials.

<https://fusiontables.googleusercontent.com/fusiontables/embedviz?q=select+col1+from+1Ph8o365O0AemIo5dbWXmRFoqADqDrxAAWak2QMjS&viz=MAP&h=false&lat=35.88298632590236&lng=126.53483447031249&t=1&z=7&l=col1&y=2&tmplt=2&hml=GEOCODABLE>.

	Memorial (위안부결의안기림비)	Long Island, New York, United States of America	Gwangjucity
April 15, 2014	Peace Monument	Seongnam, Korea	Seongnam city
May 3, 2014	Peace Monument	Olympic park, Suwon, Korea	Civic organization (수원평화비건립추진위원회)
May 28, 2014	Peace Monument	Anseong, Korea(유무상통마을)	Oroji Welfare Institution
May 30, 2014	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	The Comfort Women Memorial Peace Garden, Government Center in Fairfax County, Virginia, United States of America	Civic organization(워싱턴지역정신대문제대책위원회) in partnership with the Fairfax County Government
August 4, 2014	Comfort Women Memorial (위안부기림비)	Liberty Plaza, Union City, New Jersey, United States of America	Union City
August 14, 2014	Peace Monument	Dongtan Central Park, Hwaseong, Korea	Civic organization(화성시평화의소녀상건립추진위원회) in partnership with Hwaseong-si
August 16, 2014	Peace Monument	Korean Cultural Center, Michigan, United States of America	Korean Americans in Michigan, Civic organization (소녀상건립위원회)
December 24, 2014	Peace Monument	Seoul, Korea(대현문화공원)	Civic organization (평화나비네트워크)
March 1, 2015	Peace Monument	Boramae Park, Daejeon, Korea	Civic organization (대전평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)
March 1, 2015	Peace Monument	Ulsan Park, Ulsan, Korea	Civic organization (평화의소녀상건립을위한울산시민운동본부)
March 2, 2015	Peace Monument	Mokchon High School, Cheonan, Korea	Mokchon High School
August 5, 2015	Peace Monument	Gangneung, Korea	-
August 11, 2015	Comfort Women Memorial (여성인권수호기원상)	Cheongju, Korea	Civic organization (충북여성단체협의회)
August 12, 2015	Peace Monument	Dongguksa Temple, Gunsan, Korea	Civic organization (군산평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
August 13, 2015	Peace Monument	Jeonju, Korea	Civic organization (평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)
August 14, 2015	Comfort Women Memorial (나비의소원)	Gwangju Citizen's Woods, Gwangju, Korea	Civic organization (착한사람들의모임)
August 14, 2015	Peace Monument	Namhae, Korea	Namhae County
August 15, 2015	Peace Monument	Wonju, Korea	Civic organization (원주평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)
August 17, 2015	Peace Monument	Gwangmyeong cave, Gwangmyeong, Korea	Gwangmyeong city
August 25, 2015	Peace Monument	Ma Deul Park, Nowon, Seoul	Nowon-gu office
August 27, 2015	Peace Monument	Changwon, Korea	Civic organization
October 3, 2015	Peace Monument	Sejong, Korea	Civic organization (세종평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)

October 7, 2015	Peace Monument	Saraon Park, Gunwi, Korea	Civic organization (군위평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
October 28, 2015	Korea-China joint Peace Monument	Street Park, Seoul, Korea	-
October 30, 2015	Peace Monument	Seosan, Korea	Civic organization (서산평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)
November 3, 2015	Peace Monument	Franciscan Center, Seoul, Korea	Ewha Girls' High School
November 3, 2015	Peace Monument	Youth Plaza, Cheongju, Korea	Civic organization (충북평화의소녀상기림비시민추진위원회)
November 7, 2015	Peace Monument	Uijeongbu, Korea	Uijeongbu city
November 18, 2015	Peace Monument	Pohang, Korea	Civic organization (포항평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
November 18, 2015	Peace Monument	Korean Center, Toronto, Canada	Civic organization (화성시청, 화성시평화의소녀상추진위, 토론토한인회)
December 11, 2015	Peace Monument	Cheonan, Korea	Civic organization (천안평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
December 12, 2015	Peace Monument	Haenam, Korea	Civic organization (해남평화비건립추진위원회)
December 19, 2015	Peace Monument	Jeju, Korea	Civic organization (2015제주, 대학생이세우는평화비건립추진위원회)
February 3, 2016	Peace Monument	Bucheon, Korea	Civic organization (부천시일본군위안부피해자기림비건립추진위원회)
March 1, 2016	Peace Monument	Busan, Korea	-
March 1, 2016	Peace Monument	Dangjin, Korea	Civic organization (당진평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
March 8, 2016	Peace Monument	Asan, Korea	Civic organization (평화의소녀상아산건립추진위원회)
April 8, 2016	Peace Monument	Mokpo, Korea	Civic organization (목포평화의소녀상건립추진위원회)
May 12, 2016	Peace Monument	Namwon, Korea	Civic organization (남원평화의소녀상건립시민추진위원회)

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